I don't know what's worse: a gradual realisation that there's going to be nothing that anyone can do to prevent your sudden, violent death or a gradual realisation that you're going to be slowly asphyxiated.
The human brain can run on up to 70% ketones overall (this is not only safe, but it appears to have additional therapeutic benefits) and your body can synthesize glucose in your liver and kidneys from fats and proteins though gluconeogenesis to supply the remaining parts of your brain that can't metabolize betahydroxybutyrate, acetoacetate and acetone.
You get this with anything that hasn't been mass-produced at a large scale and commodified for a long time. It's more remarkable that something like a car (or a mobile phone, or a CPU) is cheap than that something like an electric bike motor is expensive. And it could be that this is a poor application for this type of motor technology and that a better type will be developed and that we'll look back on this as an expensive relic that was holding us back.
He's probably hesitant to do something that would be likely to bring his company's satellites closer to being seen as combatants in a proxy war between major powers, seeing as they were being used as an important part of Ukraine's drone warfare in this case, and actively countering Russia's countermeasures would be likely to move the status of him and his business interests from "relatively neutral" to "Axis of Evil".
It's p̶a̶r̶t̶i̶c̶u̶l̶a̶r̶l̶y̶ pretty hard to obtain guidance systems and components or certain types of ruggedized electronics that haven't been deliberately gimped to prevent them from being used in supersonic or exoatmospheric missiles while on the USA Naughty List, and North Korea doesn't yet seem to have an advanced manufacturing base for this that I'm aware of, whereas Texas or Japan would be a different story.
while this is true, the resulting difficulty is often overstated for both political and historical reasons. itar was conceived in a very different technological, political, and economic world
Cryptographically verified recordings don't sound practical to me (sensors and video processing electronics sound like a lot of hardware to put in a secure element), but I'm sure we will see generative AI inflating away the value of blackmail material soon; one mitigation for this could be cryptographically signing material and then publishing the signature long before it becomes practical to fake it (i.e. the past, increasingly), then periodically creating signatures with new algorithms in advance of the discovery of practical attacks on existing ones.
The only thing that'd need to be in a secure element would be the signing keys. This has existed for a while for digital cameras. Canon, Nikon, and Sony have all brought still image solutions to market for use in situations like photojournalism or forensic evidence collection.
Device signing can be used very effectively to tell if a particular devices was involved in an action - but it is far more difficult to tell if some non-specific device was the source or whether it was generated. When it comes to fabricated video evidence we'd need to establish a circle of trust that included every camera ever produced but was somehow secure and unforgeable. We've seen this approach break down previously with Diginotar[1] - it really only takes on weak link in the system to compromise the verification. At the scale with which cameras are demanded it seems unreasonable to expect a centralized signing administration to be able to keep their tokens all completely secured.
> When it comes to fabricated video evidence we'd need to establish a circle of trust that included every camera ever produced
Stopping short of that, there'd still be value in being able to cryptographically prove that your home surveillance video (or dash cam video) came from _your_ camera and is unaltered from the original recording.
I think going forward, the "circle of trust" for the next "capital insurrection type event" video evidence will be founded on multiple videos of the same scenes from multiple angles and from devices owned by un related individuals.
Although, the biggest category of cameras these days is cell phones, and all (most?) of them have some sort of hardware trust store with private keys that are extremely difficult to extract, so it wouldn't be to much of a stretch to consider having Android and iOS default camera app being able to digitally sign photos/video - all without "a centralized signing administration" and piggybacking on existing token security methods...
I don't think that the signer would be able to verify the authenticity of the data that it received from the sensor and image processing circuitry unless they were able to authenticate each other securely. I know that an attack on a system like you proposed would still be expensive, but it would become more attractive if its characteristics were overplayed (and would then be subject to legal challenge). Forensics, of course on the other hand is based on experts saying "yes, by all accounts this appears to have happened".
