This looks really amazing. Thank you Shashi.

Does this need Julia 0.4?

A very minor comment - In the markdown example, you need to add "Interpolate \KaTeX" in the input (it is there in the output but not in the input).

Greatly appreciate the summary. Thank you.

Something like Julia's PyCall package that allows calling arbitrary Python packages from Julia would also be great.

NimBorg is what you're looking for, https://github.com/micklat/NimBorg

The author of the article says that relative (to Python and R) paucity of the libraries should not stop one from using Julia. I completely second this for another reason, which is the awesome PyCall package, using which you can make use of any Python library.

Whenever I have tried to use Numba, I find it is slower than standard python. OTOH, Julia just works. Gives me the same performance as C.

I clicked on "Sign in via Google" button. It asked me for permission to access some information. Then went back to the original homepage; the one that still asks me to sign in. Now, if I click on "Sign in via Google" nothing happens. Also, nothing else on the page is clickable. How do I try it out?

The site wasn't meant to be publicly released yet - it was online only for internal testing amongst a small set of users. Its under very heavy load now so is most likely unresponsive. You can get a similar experience by trying out IJulia on your own machine though, until its properly released.

No, it does not say how people should behave? It analyzes strategic situations using various equilibrium concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium. If you are not sure that your opponent will play the Nash equilibrium strategy, Game theory doesn't tell you what you should do.

That's when you use Bayesian Nash equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium. No big deal.

I take some issue with the idea that we can simply just rely on another equilibrium refinement and say "no big deal".

It seems a bit silly to observe some behavior in a game and say "See that's a Nash Equilibrium, so game theory works", and then to turn around and observe some non-NE behavior and say "well in this game, BNE is clearly the right model, so game theory still works". And then yet again to observe some more behavior that conflicts with the theory (or to get rid of silly equilibrium) and say "ah, now we simply use perfect Bayes" or trembling hand equilibrium, or actually we were totally using correlated equilibrium this whole time.

In any case, it feels weird that a theory should behave like the "No true Scotsman" fallacy. We can always get the equilibrium by simply redefining what we mean by equilibrium.

Thanks for sharing. This is an awesome read!

I concur. I wish it were easier to setup.

I agree. I think the Cython version is eminently readable.