Non of which is necessary to verify you crossed age threshold. Websites are just lazy, maybe on purpose. Accepting this kind of low effort age verification would be foolish.
Well, to be more specific, "modern internet/web". Most of the applications that ran on a Windows XP computers still run on a Windows XP computer without hiccups, unless they do a lot of network connectivity for the functionality.
And no one can even give a concrete answer why root certificates need expiration dates. It's just because reasons.
IMO the whole PKI thing is a terrible idea to begin with. It would make much more sense to tie the trust in TLS to DNS somehow, since the certificates themselves depend on domains anyway. Then you would only have a single root of trust, and that would be your DNS provider (or the root servers). And nothing will expire ever again.
Root certificates need expiration dates for the same reason that LetsEncrypt certs need an expiration date: risk of cert compromise and forgery increases over time.
Over a long enough timeline, there will be vulns discovered in so much of the software that guards the CA certs in RAM
> risk of cert compromise and forgery increases over time.
And what if the certificate is compromised before it expires? Right, there's a revocation mechanism for that. So why expire them then if they can be revoked anyway IF they get compromised?
The reason why domain TLS certificates expire is that domains can change owners. It makes sense that it should not be possible for someone to buy a domain for one year, get a non-expiring TLS certificate issued for it, and then have the ability to MitM its traffic if it ever gets bought by someone else later.
Domain certificates are sent as part of the connection handshake, so them expiring is unnoticeable for the end users. However, root certificates rely on the OS getting updates forever, which is unsustainable. Some systems lack the ability to install user-provided root CAs altogether, and some (Android) do allow it but treat them as second-class.
Because the most dangerous secret is one that has been compromised and you don’t know it. This sets a time limit for their usefulness. Sometimes the stories about terrible default choices that are insecure sink in and architects choose a better path.
Also, details about the certs and the standards for them change over time. This makes it easier for the browser venders (via the CA forum) to force cert providers to update over time.
The instant we bound encrypted connections with identity we failed. And decades later we're still living with the mistake.
I'm completely serious when we need to abandon the ID verification part of certificates. That's an entirely separate problem from encryption protocol. An encryption protocol needs absolutely no expiration date, it's useful until it's broken, and no one can predict that. Identity should be verified in a separate path.
Do certificate revocation lists need to keep including certificates that have long since expired? I don't see why root certificates need to expire as long as the certificates signed by those roots all have reasonable expiration windows, unless someone is doing something strange about trusting formerly-valid certificates, or not checking root certificates against revocation lists.
Of course they do, they have to. But it's okay for things that are sent to you over the network to expire. It's not okay for things built into your potentially abandoned OS to expire.
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