This is an oversimplification. Density in fact makes public infrastructure more efficient and more predictable.
As Mason Gaffney notes in his article, "Containment Policies for Urban Sprawl"
"Consider water distribution. If demand doubles within a fixed service area by doubling density, we need simply expand all pipe diameters—and not by double, but by the square root of two, since cross-sections increase with the square of the radius. But if demand doubles by doubling the service area, at constant density, we must, (a) double our pipe mileage; (b) double the cross section of our old system at its base, and more than double it elsewhere, to transmit the extra load through to the new extension; (c) increase pressure at the system load center to maintain it at the fringes (especially if the new lands are higher); and (d) upgrade our pipe-joints to hold the extra pressure.
Actually those four simplest considerations understate the case a good deal. We should add the factor of peaking. The fewer customers on a given line, the higher is the usual ratio of peak demand to mean daily demand because there is less pooling of offsetting demand patterns, and more lawn sprinkling. There is also a factor of planning expansion.
"Containing urban sprawl" does not imply halting growth, but holding it inside compact increments, whose ultimate density is known in advance and will be reached quickly, saving utilities from the waste of under- or oversizing their lines in the face of uncertainty. Urban sprawl as known today not only reduces density but breeds extreme uncertainty of future density."
This piece is kind of embarassing. It certainly attempts to lump a lot of blame on the feet of LVT, which is not too surprising given the author has a history of hostility to the idea.
"With that in mind a 4,000 strong land valuation workforce was recruited. It was on the basis of that valuation that the tax was to be calculated on subsequent sales of land. However, from the start the collection of the new tax was confounded by problems. It took time to embark on a national land valuation programme. In the meantime, many local Tory councils proved to be unsympathetic and obstructive and tax judgments and valuations were regularly challenged by landlords in the courts. This meant that by 1914 only £612,787 had been collected. The war further complicated the land valuation programme as well as sales in land and then after the end of the war the Conservative-dominated post-war Coalition Government delivered the coup de grace to land taxation when all traces were removed from the statute book."
None of this is actually remotely relevant to a modern day property tax system that focuses on land, but it just goes to show the intellectual dishonest framing of the author.
(p.276)
The cost of compliance and of administration of a land value tax system may be comparable to or better than an income tax or property tax system. An income tax has a cost of collection of around 1 percent of revenues (Australian Taxation Office 1979: Table “Cost of Collection of Taxes Administered by Taxation Office”). By contrast, the cost of collecting the Australian Commonwealth Land Tax of 1910 was 1.25 percent (Scheftel 1916: 86). This was a federal tax from 1910 to 1952, comparable in scope to a national income tax. However, it should be noted:
(a) The total cost of administration in 1910 was 3.5 percent, but that included the nonrecurring cost of setting up the land value tax system (Scheftel 1916: 86, 88).
(b) The Australian federal land tax was on a progressive, not proportional, basis, which made its administration more complex and costly than a uniform ad valorem tax would have been (Bird 1960: 392).
The average tax rate of 1.2 percent took about 25 percent of the income from landownership (assuming an interest rate of 5 percent and no land appreciation). With a higher tax rate and fewer loopholes for tax avoidance, the costs of collection and administration would have been a smaller percentage of total revenues."
Wherever Land Value Rating applies it has been adopted by poll of ratepayers, representing a lot of work and profound social concern. Wherever Capital or Annual Value Rating applies it has been imposed by Government or Councils, contrary to the express wishes of the ratepayers in almost every case.15
With certain exceptions16 local LVT, assessed through the LV system, was preferred where democratic choice was allowed, but this choice was removed in1988 by the Labour government, which revoked the democratic polls that had kept the local LVT in place for more than 130 years."
Assessors observe market activity. The 'purchase price' when you buy land is based on the highest and best potential use of land. The "Land Value Tax" merely appropriates this observed value for public expense (and potential dividend distribution).
The fact that you compared 'prime real estate' to swampland or desert demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of ad valorem taxation and land rent generally. While the rate should be the same (ideally as close to 100% as we can get without causing issues) the actual -value- would be dramatically different.
Under your hypothetical question, the desert and/or swampland could very well have 0 rental value, which means the tax would collect 0 from these locations. 100% of $0 = 0.
"Tax is someone taking money by force" <--False, the entire ownership regime of land is an exercise in force. Land rent is either publicly collected or privately captured. When one has the (correct) philosophical position that everyone has an equal right to use land, it simply becomes a matter of 'who' receives the rent. As a matter of justice, the value of a free gift of nature should be shared. To believe otherwise is to believe that some people have less of a right to live, as land is required for all life and economic activity.
"Robs you of assets faster the more valuable it is" <--False, it collects the advantages that accrue to land (a free gift of nature) in exact proportion to the benefit that the land provides. Land value is a social surplus, not a charge.
"random person will dictate what you owe" <--False, assessments are made by observing the market according to well-established principles. See: https://www.iaao.org/ and just like today, you can establish multiple levels of oversight and include the option to appeal.
That's how externalities work. It isn't particularly a 'fine dependence' or driving people toward owning massive quantities of land. If you buy those things then you paid for them and for them to keep their value you must maintain them. If you believe you can do this at a lower price than the state, more power to you. Rent gets paid whether it is publicly collected or privately captured. The point is that when you -don't- own them but benefit from the work of others, you should pay for them.
Edward Treadwell, the biographer of Henry Miller, the "Cattle King", noted: "for the smaller farmer irrigation districts are essential, but for the large landowners and cattlemen, they were deemed a menace. They compelled development... they transferred control from the large landholder to the populace. They invaded the liberty of action on which the land barons prospered."
The Chamber of Commerce in Modesto in the same year stated, "as a result of the exemption of improvements many of the large ranches have been cut up and sold in small tracts. The new owners are cultivating these farms intensively. The population of both country and city has increased... the new system of taxation has brought great prosperity to our district. Farmers are now encouraged to improve their property. Industry and thrift are not punished by an increase in taxes."
Fred Foldvary has an interesting paper called "Walt Disney World as a Rent-Funded Community" https://cooperative-individualism.org/foldvary-fred_walt-dis... in which he notes, "WDW obviously has had an impact on the development of Central Florida. The population in the greater Orlando area grew from 30,000 in 1965 to 450,000 in 1970 and 1.1 million in 1990. The labor force grew from 186,000 to 620,000 (Facts and Figures, 1990). With this growth, WDW has induced an increased land value in the area, but the surrounding developments in turn increase the value of its land, hence it is an open question how large the value received from external developments is, relative to the value exported to the region."
There's no secret power associated with 'buying up surrounding land and public works'. The cost and benefit are proportional, paying a tax or paying for the capital costs/upkeep/maintenance are commensurate.
This is true, however it was still a property tax (appreciation of course is due to land but the disincentive on improvements is still there), it was poorly administered (long periods between assessments) and it was during the extreme inflation of the 70's.
This is definitely an issue with levying LVT at fairly low rates. Granted, at the time it was relatively high but it wasn't high enough. The 'ideal' LVT would bring down the price of land -considerably-, close to $0. The fact that land still has a large selling price means it is still largely financed with loans, and sensitive to interest rate adjustments.
Henry George recognized that there were benefits to private control, security of tenure, productivity, etc. These ideas were well recognized by classical economists/liberals, Locke, etc.
There is ultimately no -perfect- solution to the land problem because 2 objects cannot exist in the same place at the same time so -any- solution will be somewhat arbitrary.
However, the advantage one plot of land has over another manifests in its rental value. Therefore, you pay everyone else according to the natural advantage your location has. If only marginal land is left for me, then that reflects in the fact that I pay nothing and receive a share of the differential advantage in return.
Nothing in society will ever be perfect, but compared to alternatives and also recognizing that other forms of land control are also problematic, the solution in the article makes quite perfect sense.
If the full rental value of land were collected then its selling price would be $0. That is a far cry from the tax system we have today. Urban locations are the most relevant for society, but all the same there would be benefits to farmland use as well. The selling price of land is recognized as the primary barrier to entry for new farmers.
As Mason Gaffney notes in his article, "Containment Policies for Urban Sprawl"
"Consider water distribution. If demand doubles within a fixed service area by doubling density, we need simply expand all pipe diameters—and not by double, but by the square root of two, since cross-sections increase with the square of the radius. But if demand doubles by doubling the service area, at constant density, we must, (a) double our pipe mileage; (b) double the cross section of our old system at its base, and more than double it elsewhere, to transmit the extra load through to the new extension; (c) increase pressure at the system load center to maintain it at the fringes (especially if the new lands are higher); and (d) upgrade our pipe-joints to hold the extra pressure.
Actually those four simplest considerations understate the case a good deal. We should add the factor of peaking. The fewer customers on a given line, the higher is the usual ratio of peak demand to mean daily demand because there is less pooling of offsetting demand patterns, and more lawn sprinkling. There is also a factor of planning expansion.
"Containing urban sprawl" does not imply halting growth, but holding it inside compact increments, whose ultimate density is known in advance and will be reached quickly, saving utilities from the waste of under- or oversizing their lines in the face of uncertainty. Urban sprawl as known today not only reduces density but breeds extreme uncertainty of future density."