European Protestantism and American Protestantism differ in substantial ways. Crudely, European Protestantism went the way of Hegelian dialectics and evolving beyond the Christianity of the Bible. American (conservative) Protestantism largely reacted against that. I think both groups are largely held together by politics today though their politics differ in the expected ways.
Have you seen the current pope? He's a big step back from the last one. And the reason for this is the cardinals who wanted back, because they were never fully on board anyway. Then again what would you expect from a group where average age is significantly older than even US congress.
The current pope is a little more traditional, but it’s hard not to be more traditional than Francis. However, the cardinals as a whole are more or less on board with the previous pope’s agenda, American bishops a little less so, and many American priests much less so. Outside of America, you may be right (the brewing rebellion in Germany being an extreme counter example).
American religions are more like American Indian tribal nations. They have independent jurisdiction and their income is not subject to taxation. Whether or not they engage in politics is completely their prerogative and has no bearing on their tax exempt status. It’s like saying the Navajo nation can’t engage in politics or else they would lose their tax exemption.
Further, the core reason for freedom of speech in a democracy is to have freedom for political speech. The need is to have different factions discuss ideas related to the governing of society. Any legal regime that restricts the rights of religion to engage in political speech is one that rejects the separation of church and state. The purpose of the separation is to prevent the government from interfering with the rights of disfavored religious groups or granting special privileges to favored religions. If an individual has a right to political speech, then an association of individuals also has that right whether or not it is religious in nature.
The original law (like many laws that delegated congressional authorities at the time) contained a legislative veto provision which gave the legislative final oversight of any administrative action. In the 80’s the Supreme Court found that legislative veto provisions were unconstitutional, but left all of those delegations standing. After that ruling, the administration can now do what it wanted without congressional oversight and the ability to veto any attempt to repeal the laws. In the oral arguments, Gorsuch raised the possibility that the law itself should have been found unconstitutional in the 80’s because the legislative veto was essential to its function. It looks like the court today took a minimalist approach, letting these delegations stand but minimizing the scope of the powers delegated.
“In any statutory definition of a crime ‘malice’ must be taken not in the old vague sense of ‘wickedness’ in general, but as requiring either (i) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done, or (ii) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (ie the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk of it).” R v Cunningham
The Dunning-Kruger effect is not well established. It often doesn't reproduce.
Also the effect isn't that people misjudge their knowledge, it's that they misjudge their place within a distribution. Suppose I give an exam to 30 people, and the results are normally distributed around a score of 70 with a low of 40 and a high of 97. The bottom of the distribution may accurately predict that they scored about 40 on the exam, but if you ask them how they performed relative to their peers, they will believe that they are about average and guess that a sizable portion of the class performed worse than them. Alternatively, if you ask the top performer who scored a 97, they will say that they think they scored about 97, but they will think maybe a few other people scored higher and maybe that the average was in the high 80s. The Dunning-Kruger effect posits that people are actually pretty good at accessing their own knowledge without being a good judge of how knowledgeable others are.
>Also the effect isn't that people misjudge their knowledge, it's that they misjudge their place within a distribution.
Put differently, isn’t this saying it’s a misattribution of confidence? In the context of the original claim about investing, that seems very relevant.
