It should, opkssh just creates ssh public keys. The integration tests don't current cover that case so I created an issue to add that to the integration tests:
One can still hold that it's a better link, it's a matter of preference. Anyways, if you scroll the original article to the very end it does contain an impressive set of photos. It is beautiful.
I can't find any viable alternative. Keyboard is much faster than those click and release interfaces. Keyboards also have repeat keys, when you press a character for a long time you can actually press and depress the shift key and see the change in the line of characters input. This is extremely useful feature in games, graphic design software and other applications.
Generation of keystroke based on the up event, beside been incompatible with repeating keys for long strokes, will slow down typing significantly, as it requires tracking timing pressing keys for longer duration. I'm pretty sure that this isn't only effect of me being used to track keypress timing on the way down, but an unavoidable result of the duration of the action.
Waiting for up event on contemporary GUI, when the contempt UI is a sluggish fit-to-nothing dirty touchscreen in a public kiosk is sensible. When you know an interface will yield more errors than intended input it is only sensible to assume that any input is a mistake unless the user is making an effort to validate it.
Keyboard repeat is only useful in ANSI terminal games on Unix, and games on some old 8 bit home computers that didn't have up and down events (Apple II+, ...).
A game written for an IBM PC and everything after that can know exactly which keys are being held down and when they are released by intercepting the "scan codes" (or abstract keyboard events in a GUI event loop).
All that is missing is synthesizer-like velocity and pressure info. :)
> will slow down typing significantly
Only for people who have to look at the screen. :)
The hunt-and-peck beginners who look at their fingers are not effect, and neither are those who can look at something else or close their eyes.
A serious concern affecting even those people is that using the release event could reorder things, causing mistakes. Like say if someone types the sequece wh (involving two hands) such that they release the w later than h.
While I didn't find the joke funny, it does thematically match the piece - the hacker who supposedly see the possibility to get free internet as a viable opportunity. Later in the piece the author does distance himself from that image, revealing the tone in the opening was merely a stylistic choice, a writer's device, as clearly he is not the kind of a person who will in practice exploit the airline systems.
Assuming you are a man, I'm not sure you would say the same thing if the arbitrary lingual fact was opposite, and on your door it would be written in bold chairwoman, or if you were been introduced as a policewoman.
I'm not sure I'm for changing the language all over, but I don't think dismissing issues that disturb a group that you don't belong to is a manner that fits a gentleman.
The characterization of the scientific method as proposing hypotheses and then putting them to test was given by a philosopher in the previous century. While the hypotheses that this is the character of the scientific method is still very common, it was refuted long ago, both by observations and by logic reasoning.
I didn't say anything about the scientific method though, I'm simply making a distinction about two groups of people who both seem to claim to generate understanding of our reality.
One group can and does test hypotheses, the other does not
Rights is well developed subject in modern ethics, and it doesn't require God or morality in the sense of "Doing X is bad and therefore immoral". But any discussion of rights is discussion of moral theory.
Modern ethical philosophers have developed ethic theories that propose secular basis for universal rights, moral theory that doesn't rely on God (Rawls is a famous example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice)
Nothing I am saying is at odds with modern ethics. I am literally presenting what is basically hetheredoxy. Rights can be natural or artifical (social, legal, etc...). For rights to be natural, you need to appeal to a God, or to natural morality. If you are looking for rights that aren't necessarily natural, you can derive them from a moral theory. There are moral theories that are not derived from an appeal to divinity or metaphysics, but they cannot claim to be naturally and objectively true.
So I still do not understand how we aren't saying the same thing. Rawls proposes a system of universal rights based on a particular moral theory, he does not prove that his system of rights is natural, it is artificial. In fact, Rawls is not a proponent of natural rights, he is a proponent of socially determined rights, hence his theory of the Veil that allows us to socially evaluate proposed rules.
We seem to disagree on the definition of natural rights. For a right to be natural you require that it will be granted by God or that it will be based on human nature, and by human nature you mean to say that it is a direct product of the evolution biology that have created our species. While I would grant you that it's a definition that you can find in many philosophers, following Moore, but in the current context I think that the natural/artificial distinction isn't useful for defining natural rights.
I would argue that this definition is very narrow and limiting, it introduce weird dependency on our current scientific knowledge, and isn't very useful. For instance, when Hobbes proposed the social contract theory he was discussing natural rights but today we know that his natural science knowledge was incorrect and therefore he was actually describing artificial rights. To me this makes no sense. Instead, I will propose, that rights that are derived by reason, that are universal, and that do not depend on a specific state law or the social norms of a specific society are natural rights. They are natural in the sense that they are not dependent on any state or law but are inherent. Those rights are not granted by god, and they are not artificial law propositions. They are based on universal principals of reason and the reality of human existence.
This view and this definition of natural rights is not my invention. It's reflected in the language of the universal declaration of human rights - which recognizes a set of universal rights. The declaration isn't a legal document that legislate a binding law. It recognize rights that are not (let's hope, are not yet) generally accepted by all nations. Nevertheless those rights are not based on God or born by the act of composing and publishing the declaration, those are natural rights. They are natural despite being in opposition to humans natural behavior, despite their consistent violation. It is because those rights are natural that they can serve as basis and justification for international law and justice.
Rawls theory of rights is universal, it isn't about specific social norms, it discuss human society in principle. One might say that his ethics are based on theory of the human nature.
Natural and legal rights are well established terms that are being used, discussed and evaluated since ancient times. The term natural right precede our discovery of evolution by 2 millennia. Whether the right to property is natural right or not is a separate point and debatable.
The term natural right since ancient times was a religious construct that has little or nothing to do with the modern, post-Renaissance understanding of the term, so tracing a lineage here is a definitional error. In any case, what a natural right is isn't (and cannot be) a well established term, and indeed the rise in atheism is a fundamental threat to the doctrine, as most all ideas of natural law have to rely on a God to avoid the naturalistic fallacy.
God is of very little help (here), as pointed by Plato/Socrates in the Uthyphro dilemma. The naturalistic fallacy is not limited to natural rights, as Hume's is-ought is applicable to legal rights just the same - you can't logically deduce from the fact that there are laws that mandate rights a conclusion that one ought to abide by them.
Natural or universal rights does not require theism. Robert Nozick is famous proponent of the secular based position that property is a natural right.
Natural rights do really require theism to be truly natural, ie, independent of morality and society. Theism avoids the is-ought problem by forgoing the ought, with theism natural law can simply be, and whether you decide you ought to abide them is no longer so important.
Nozick's position on the existence natural rights is simply not grounded. He appeals to intuition and to the reader's morality to appeal for their existence, but he doesn't (and cannot) actually deduce their existence once he forgoes theism. He makes a few appeals to Kant, but they obviously cannot be sufficient, Kant's conditions are merely necessary. I'm very confused by your reference to Nozick on a discussion about the grounding of natural rights when Nozick himself admits that he cannot justify them - he simply assumes Locke, which himself uses a theistic argument, in ASU. If you want, I can get the quote, but I don't have time to skim it until I'm home from work.
At the end of the day, secular natural rights is an intuitive and appealing but ungrounded position that cannot be logically justified, hence why it is threatened by theism. It is no wonder that positive rights and social right theory only really emerged after the Renaissance.
> Natural rights do really require theism to be truly natural, ie, independent of morality and society. Theism avoids the is-ought problem by forgoing the ought, with theism natural law can simply be, and whether you decide you ought to abide them is no longer so important.
Hume's original text describing the is-ought problem is specifically targeting justification of ethics on god. Laws that no one is ought to abide by are no laws but nonsense.
Is murder immoral because god hate murder, or do god hate murder because it is immoral?
> At the end of the day, secular natural rights is an intuitive and appealing but ungrounded position that cannot be logically justified
Many will argue that no moral theory can be logically justified, and that the search for logical justification is category error
> Hume's original text describing the is-ought problem is specifically targeting justification of ethics on god. Laws that no one is ought to abide by are no laws but nonsense.
> Is murder immoral because god hate murder, or do god hate murder because it is immoral?
We agree here, but that isn't how religion solves the problem. Religious laws are also enforced by threats in the afterlife and violence in the present life, not merely by reason, so they do not need to solve the is-ought problem like secular laws do. Of course, religious law has other problems.
> Many will argue that no moral theory can be logically justified, and that the search for logical justification is category error
I agree completely, hence why it is impossible to derive rights that are logically justified without an appeal to God. The comment I was replying to claimed there were logically justified rights which have to follow from logically justified moral theories unless they are decreed from beyond reason, and since the latter is a category error, so is the former.
> We agree here, but that isn't how religion solves the problem. Religious laws are also enforced by threats in the afterlife and violence in the present life, not merely by reason, so they do not need to solve the is-ought problem like secular laws do. Of course, religious law has other problems.
You are mixing law with moral/ethics. Secular law doesn't have is-ought problem, it is enforced by the state law enforcement forces. Pressure to abide to the laws doesn't entail or justify their morality.
> I agree completely, hence why it is impossible to derive rights that are logically justified without an appeal to God. The comment I was replying to claimed there were logically justified rights which have to follow from logically justified moral theories unless they are decreed from beyond reason, and since the latter is a category error, so is the former.
It wasn't. It was arguing for inherent rights. The claim for inherent rights can be justified. It can't be justified by logic just like it cannot be proved mathematically. But it can be justified ethically using reason.
> And no, you are wrong - your right not be attacked is based on morality, you say "attacking someone is wrong"
You are mixing morality with justice, which (in the modern world) is based on rights. "Attacking someone is wrong" is a moral statement, it puts the focus and the obligation of individuals to keep moral behavior. My right not to be attacked is not based on moral and not dependent on the morality or the beliefs of any other people, it is based on justice, a social contract that declare a set of a societal or universal rights granted to every individual.
And this societal rights are based on a shared understanding of what is moral and amoral, often dictated by works of religion or historically stemming from such.
