I'm not even sure that that's completely accurate. I think the Russians are demonstrating a failure to accurately assess the likely strength of their enemy.
In Georgia in 2008, skirmishes began in earnest on 8th August, and Russia were ready to roll into Tbilisi by the 14th.
I believe that Putin expected Ukraine to be very similar to Georgia - very fast advances to the capital, and ultimately capitulation from the Ukrainians to the Russians almost immediately.
The key to winning in Georgia was an overwhelming display of force. In Ukraine, I believe the strategy was the same - let Ukrainians see tank after tank after tank rolling through their villages, gently 'soften' the cities with artillery before rolling through the cities, and reach the capital in a few days. Furthermore, I think Putin genuinely wanted to avoid civilian and military casualties as much as possible, so a 'blitzkrieg' was preferable.
If you're moving that quickly, you don't need supply lines, you don't need logistics to the same extent, especially if your plan is not to occupy, just to withdraw after (for example) reinstating Yanukovic.
I think it's a legitimate strategy, but they gambled that they'd be able to achieve it and lost. That miscalculation has cost Russia a lot of time, morale, and equipment. I think now they're starting to adjust to the reality, which is that Ukraine were stronger than they were expecting in the first place, and on top of that, they're being supplied with weapons and real-time intelligence from the West. Assuming diplomatic efforts continue to fail, I see Russia now withdrawing to territory they are confident they control, and consolidating their forces, and beginning a war of attrition, which in the long run, Russia are likely to win.
However, there's a good chance that diplomacy will be successful. This war is incredibly costly for Russia, and if Putin finds a way to spin it that Russia have 'won' or 'achieved their objective' or whatever, then I think he will take that route - provided Russia maintains control of Sevastopol.
In Georgia in 2008, skirmishes began in earnest on 8th August, and Russia were ready to roll into Tbilisi by the 14th.
I believe that Putin expected Ukraine to be very similar to Georgia - very fast advances to the capital, and ultimately capitulation from the Ukrainians to the Russians almost immediately.
The key to winning in Georgia was an overwhelming display of force. In Ukraine, I believe the strategy was the same - let Ukrainians see tank after tank after tank rolling through their villages, gently 'soften' the cities with artillery before rolling through the cities, and reach the capital in a few days. Furthermore, I think Putin genuinely wanted to avoid civilian and military casualties as much as possible, so a 'blitzkrieg' was preferable.
If you're moving that quickly, you don't need supply lines, you don't need logistics to the same extent, especially if your plan is not to occupy, just to withdraw after (for example) reinstating Yanukovic.
I think it's a legitimate strategy, but they gambled that they'd be able to achieve it and lost. That miscalculation has cost Russia a lot of time, morale, and equipment. I think now they're starting to adjust to the reality, which is that Ukraine were stronger than they were expecting in the first place, and on top of that, they're being supplied with weapons and real-time intelligence from the West. Assuming diplomatic efforts continue to fail, I see Russia now withdrawing to territory they are confident they control, and consolidating their forces, and beginning a war of attrition, which in the long run, Russia are likely to win.
However, there's a good chance that diplomacy will be successful. This war is incredibly costly for Russia, and if Putin finds a way to spin it that Russia have 'won' or 'achieved their objective' or whatever, then I think he will take that route - provided Russia maintains control of Sevastopol.