Those videos are only published in cases where there is something interesting and propaganda-wise useful to show. Mostly a success of the publishing party. What you do not see are the hours and hours of flying along tree lines hoping to spot something. For every soldier you see being chased by a drone, you don't see the dozens overlooked by that same drone.
Camouflage is never panacea, but useful camouflage exists, even today. I've (almost) stepped on comrades in an exercise that were hidden well enough to not see them from 3m in broad daylight. But for things to work that well, you need to know what makes humans detect their prey. Movement is a dead giveaway, so as soon as you are running you are toast anyways, and only sheer luck might save you. Form and contour is another problem, something human-shaped and green will stand out, even among other green things. See something rectangular in the forest? Bomb it, rectangular trees are rare. Texture is another giveaway, things looking smooth, regular or out-of-place compared to nearby textures. That's why your camouflaged tank will look like a bush or pile of leaves when properly camouflaged.
All this means that of course you have to go beyond camouflage paint and camouflage clothes. Both are a start, and will help to a point, as a base layer, and for great viewing distances. But even before drones, proper camouflage also involves covering yourself and objects in leaves, branches, nets, parking below trees, etc.
Another interesting point about Ukraine war videos: What you also usually do not see are videos of camouflage being broken by thermal imaging. Both sides have thermal equipment, but I guess are reluctant to point their enemy at how much or how little of it they have, and how vulnerable or not vulnerable the others' camouflage techniques are to it.
Also, smaller drones have a limited reach. To get at the juicy targets (logistics, headquarters) way in the back, you need more expensive and rare long-range drones. So I guess the drone density will sharply drop off beyond the first lines of trenches.
"What you do not see are the hours and hours of flying along tree lines hoping to spot something. For every soldier you see being chased by a drone, you don't see the dozens overlooked by that same drone."
Agreed, and I also agree with your other comments. But those limits (luckily for troops on the ground) are because to make detection better and more sensitive is expensive and this has to be traded off against the loss of drones and the risk of downed or crashed ones being reverse-engineered to determine their capability. Also, providing countermeasures such as thermiting the electronics when in trouble or downed not only adds precious weight but also increases costs significantly. Moreover, not only is detection sensitivity a tradeoff but the tech one gets often depends on what's actually available at that instant. Next month, week or even next encounter the tech might have improved.
As I said in my post to the comment, I'm not up to full speed on the tech being used in drones in Ukraine but over 20 years ago I was working on tech that could easily identity many targets at once. What's happened since is that this tech has become much, much more miniaturized and a great deal more sensitive not to mention much cheaper.
Right, seriouly advanced detection tech is already here as its development was already underway before the conflict for both industrial and military purposes. It's now just a matter of packaging it to be suitable for drones, and you can bet London to a brick that there are dozens working to better integrate the different technologies.
Combine it with new miniature camera tech, new LIDAR and back-end (AI) processing and it's phenomenal what can be achieved nowadays. I'd venture that if this conflict continues to drag on then you'll likely see a huge and very worrying change in drone capability.
"Camouflage is never panacea, but useful camouflage exists, even today. I've (almost) stepped on comrades in an exercise that were hidden well enough to not see them from 3m in broad daylight."
Agreed. Whilst it was long ago, I've not forgotten going A-over-T after tripping over another's legs during war games and ruled as 'dead' by the umpire thus no longer a participant because camouflage worked. That said, back then one of camouflage's giveaways was the face. We were trained to look for eyes which was effective (if close enough) because unless facial camouflage is applied properly the eyes stood out, and as most soldiers applied it to themselves and the fact that they weren't much good at incorporating the eyes in ways that created a 'delusional' image, it was a known weakness. Moreover, the facial camouflage took a lot of removing so there was resistance to applying enough of it.
Again, I'm not up to date on how facial camouflage has improved or is applied today but I'd be almost certain it wouldn't stand scrutiny from the best electronic systems. It'd be a real worry if one side had sophisticated tech in their helmets and the other didn't.
Camouflage is never panacea, but useful camouflage exists, even today. I've (almost) stepped on comrades in an exercise that were hidden well enough to not see them from 3m in broad daylight. But for things to work that well, you need to know what makes humans detect their prey. Movement is a dead giveaway, so as soon as you are running you are toast anyways, and only sheer luck might save you. Form and contour is another problem, something human-shaped and green will stand out, even among other green things. See something rectangular in the forest? Bomb it, rectangular trees are rare. Texture is another giveaway, things looking smooth, regular or out-of-place compared to nearby textures. That's why your camouflaged tank will look like a bush or pile of leaves when properly camouflaged.
All this means that of course you have to go beyond camouflage paint and camouflage clothes. Both are a start, and will help to a point, as a base layer, and for great viewing distances. But even before drones, proper camouflage also involves covering yourself and objects in leaves, branches, nets, parking below trees, etc.
Another interesting point about Ukraine war videos: What you also usually do not see are videos of camouflage being broken by thermal imaging. Both sides have thermal equipment, but I guess are reluctant to point their enemy at how much or how little of it they have, and how vulnerable or not vulnerable the others' camouflage techniques are to it.
Also, smaller drones have a limited reach. To get at the juicy targets (logistics, headquarters) way in the back, you need more expensive and rare long-range drones. So I guess the drone density will sharply drop off beyond the first lines of trenches.