So that case involves 28 USC 1425, which doesn’t have an expressly-stated materiality requirement. The holding of the case is that, nonetheless, the statute requires an omission or misrepresentation to be material, which the Court defines as information “that would have mattered to an immigration official.”
8 USC 1451(a) has an express materiality requirement, which I addressed in my comment. The standard of what “would have mattered to an immigration official” can be seen extremely broadly in view of 8 USC 1427(a). In the context of the false statements statute, 18 USC 1001, material facts are those that have the “tendency” to influence the decision maker, but need not actually influence the decision. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
The materiality requirement provides some protection. It’s doubtful revocation could be premised on someone having illegally parked their car when going into a USCIS interview. But the standard for materiality is still quite expansive and leaves a lot of room for aggressive prosecutors.
8 USC 1451(a) has an express materiality requirement, which I addressed in my comment. The standard of what “would have mattered to an immigration official” can be seen extremely broadly in view of 8 USC 1427(a). In the context of the false statements statute, 18 USC 1001, material facts are those that have the “tendency” to influence the decision maker, but need not actually influence the decision. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
The materiality requirement provides some protection. It’s doubtful revocation could be premised on someone having illegally parked their car when going into a USCIS interview. But the standard for materiality is still quite expansive and leaves a lot of room for aggressive prosecutors.