Right, which is a largely meaningless distinction: if the process runs as you, any successful attacker can simply read it out of the CrashPlan process in memory.
Again, if you're not typing the password in every time, a local compromise is almost certainly game-over. Apple's keychain helps reduce the damage if the data's not actively used but for something like CrashPlan which is always running the attacker is probably going to be lucky.
I agree that showing the encryption key in the clear is not a serious security flaw but it's IMHO against best practice.
Passwords and key are usually shown in an obscured form, usually with asterisks, and stored in the user or system keychain. You are absolutely right that the security value of these standard practices should not be overvalued but still … what else within the security framework of CrashPlan is not done in accordance with best practice?
(I assume, BTW, that CrashPlan does not use the system or user keychain on the Mac because it is not a real Mac citizen but a Java-based app. Firefox and Wuala – the latter Java-based too – don't use the user or system keychain either.)
Those arguments are typically made from the wrong perspective. It's just so common that if you don't do it, your product will be perceived as insecure. And as long as actual security is not horrible, the perception of security is what drives sales, not the actual security.
