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As I wrote, the column switches override MCAS. It's also how the crew in the first MCAS incident recovered and continued the flight and landed safely.


Didn't investigation confirmed they followed official Boeing training?


One of the airlines that suffered an MCAS crash had asked Boeing for specific training on MAX and was denied, as it would have set a bad precedent for sales.


> the column switches override MCAS.

Temporarily, right? Using the pitch trim switches on the yoke suppresses MCAS, but in order to remain at even net zero stabilizer position change, the duration of trim input would have to be of equivalent duration to the reciprocal MCAS-driven change. This is part of what made the problem so insidious - running trim for that long is rarely needed and rarely done. I haven’t flown the MAX but I can’t think of any type I have flown in which continual pitch trim input of 5+ seconds at a time would be required in flight.


If you examine the Lion Air crash, they restored normal trim with the column trim switches 25 times.




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