> That's why I said that the currently popular definition of "computer" has ontological problems.
Indeed. To elaborate a bit more on this...
Whether a definition is good or bad is at least partly determined by its purpose. Good as what kind of definition?
If the purpose is theoretical, then the common notion of "computer" suffers from epistemic inadequacy. (I'm not sure the common notion rises above mere association and family resemblance to the rank of "definition".)
If the purpose is practical, then under prevailing conditions, what people mean by "computer" in common speech is usually adequate: "this particular form factor of machine used for this extrinsic purpose". Most people would call desktop PCs "computers", but they wouldn't call their mobile phones computers, even though ontologically and even operationally, there is no essential difference. From the perspective of immediate utility as given, there is a difference.
I don't see the relevance of "social construction" here, though. Sure, people could agree on a definition of computer, and that definition may be theoretically correct or merely practically useful or perhaps neither, but this sounds like a distraction.
> I'm not sure that your definition helps capture what people mean by "computer" or helps us approach a more ontologically coherent definition either.
In common speech? No. But the common meaning is not scientific (in the broad sense of that term, which includes ontology) and inadequate for ontological definition, because it isn't a theoretical term. So while common speech can be a good starting point for analysis, it is often inadequate for theoretical purposes. Common meanings must be examined, clarified, and refined. Technical terminology exists for a reason.
> If, by words like "computing" and "computation", you mean things like "what computers do", it's almost entirely circular
I don't see how. Computation is something human beings do and have been doing forever. It preexists machines. All machines do is mechanize the formalizable part of the process, but the computer is never party to the semantic meaning of the observing human being. It merely stands in a relation of correspondence with human formalism, the same way five beads on an abacus or the squiggle "5" on a piece of people denote the number 5. The same is true of representations that denote something other than numbers (a denotation that is, btw, entirely conventional).
Machines do not possess intrinsic purpose. The parts are accidentally arranged in a manner that merely gives the ensemble certain affordances that can be parlayed into furthering various desired human ends. This may be difficult for many today to see, because science has - for practical purposes or for philosophical reasons - projected a mechanistic conceptual framework onto reality that recasts things like organisms in mechanistic terms. But while this can be practically useful, theoretically, this mechanistic mangling of reality has severe ontological problems.
Indeed. To elaborate a bit more on this...
Whether a definition is good or bad is at least partly determined by its purpose. Good as what kind of definition?
If the purpose is theoretical, then the common notion of "computer" suffers from epistemic inadequacy. (I'm not sure the common notion rises above mere association and family resemblance to the rank of "definition".)
If the purpose is practical, then under prevailing conditions, what people mean by "computer" in common speech is usually adequate: "this particular form factor of machine used for this extrinsic purpose". Most people would call desktop PCs "computers", but they wouldn't call their mobile phones computers, even though ontologically and even operationally, there is no essential difference. From the perspective of immediate utility as given, there is a difference.
I don't see the relevance of "social construction" here, though. Sure, people could agree on a definition of computer, and that definition may be theoretically correct or merely practically useful or perhaps neither, but this sounds like a distraction.
> I'm not sure that your definition helps capture what people mean by "computer" or helps us approach a more ontologically coherent definition either.
In common speech? No. But the common meaning is not scientific (in the broad sense of that term, which includes ontology) and inadequate for ontological definition, because it isn't a theoretical term. So while common speech can be a good starting point for analysis, it is often inadequate for theoretical purposes. Common meanings must be examined, clarified, and refined. Technical terminology exists for a reason.
> If, by words like "computing" and "computation", you mean things like "what computers do", it's almost entirely circular
I don't see how. Computation is something human beings do and have been doing forever. It preexists machines. All machines do is mechanize the formalizable part of the process, but the computer is never party to the semantic meaning of the observing human being. It merely stands in a relation of correspondence with human formalism, the same way five beads on an abacus or the squiggle "5" on a piece of people denote the number 5. The same is true of representations that denote something other than numbers (a denotation that is, btw, entirely conventional).
Machines do not possess intrinsic purpose. The parts are accidentally arranged in a manner that merely gives the ensemble certain affordances that can be parlayed into furthering various desired human ends. This may be difficult for many today to see, because science has - for practical purposes or for philosophical reasons - projected a mechanistic conceptual framework onto reality that recasts things like organisms in mechanistic terms. But while this can be practically useful, theoretically, this mechanistic mangling of reality has severe ontological problems.