Nothing in your post is in line with reality. You've cherry picked statements out of context to imply that they are not exclusive to the NSA, ignoring the smoking guns that were presented and failing to link them. There is simply no question that this is USG malware, and you'll notice that Kaspersky, who, no, does not have extensive ties to the FSB and Russian government, actually stops short of attribution, unlike pretty much everyone else.
"Kaspersky’s rise is particularly notable—and to some, downright troubling—given his KGB-sponsored training, his tenure as a Soviet intelligence officer, his alliance with Vladimir Putin’s regime, and his deep and ongoing relationship with Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB. Of course, none of this history is ever mentioned in Cancun."
I'm also glad you actually read my entire post before gang banging your keyboard with your response. I said I don't dismiss this outright, but I've become somewhat skeptical of Kaspersky. He's done a good job exposing NSA activities while seemingly turning a blind eye to Russian state hacking activities. I think its fair to ask why he's catching all these NSA sponsored groups, but was totally silent about a Russian group of hackers who have had access to our critical infrastructure since 2011:
Again, like I said in my post (which you clearly didn't read) I'm getting NSA fatigue. If other Info Sec companies came out and said they had found these, in my eyes, they would have more credibility than Kaspersky. It just seems like the only stuff he finds are NSA tools and I have to consider his background before I jump up and say this is a smoking gun. Similarities? Yes. Like I said in my post, this is the same thing other Info Sec people dismissed about the Sony Hack, why can't I use the same argument here?
You want a smoking gun? Get the president to admit it like he did with Stuxnet:
"Administration officials revealed to Sanger that the Stuxnet virus was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and Israel's Unit 8200 (i.e. Israel's secretive cyber arm) to "become the attacker from within" Iran's nuclear facilities."
http://eugene.kaspersky.com/2012/07/25/what-wired-is-not-tel...