> If the IETF wants to improve privacy, it should work on protocols that provide anonymous access to signed artifacts (authentication of the content, not the connection) that is independent of the user's access mechanism.
He basically wants a better version of Freenet. Fine. However, that's orthogonal to the effort to make all channels secure channels. IETF can do both, if people are interested. Plaintext TCP needs to die, and building the infrastructure to move everyone to HTTPS is a step in that direction.
He shouldn't obstruct HTTPS just because it's not Freenet(bis). To use his Freenet(bis) vaporware, people will need to become familiar with managing private keys. HTTPS has a similar requirement, so HTTPS Everywhere is a step in the direction he wants to go.
He basically wants a better version of Freenet. Fine. However, that's orthogonal to the effort to make all channels secure channels. IETF can do both, if people are interested. Plaintext TCP needs to die, and building the infrastructure to move everyone to HTTPS is a step in that direction.
He shouldn't obstruct HTTPS just because it's not Freenet(bis). To use his Freenet(bis) vaporware, people will need to become familiar with managing private keys. HTTPS has a similar requirement, so HTTPS Everywhere is a step in the direction he wants to go.